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June 13, 2003
Sleeping Beauty And Prince Charming: Bilateral Deals Are No Fairytale
By Aziz Choudry
The recent explosion of bilateral investment and trade agreements and
investor-state disputes is of growing concern. Many mobilisations
against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) aim to stop attempts by
industrialised countries to kickstart talks on a multilateral investment
agreement at September¡¯s Cancun Ministerial meeting. But strategies to
confront neoliberal globalisation must integrate action on these lower-
profile agreements, and acknowledge how they are being used by
governments and corporations for their economic and geopolitical aims.
They attract little attention and scrutiny, eclipsed as they are by
regional and global negotiations. Yet they are being used as leverage in
multilateral negotiations, to get faster, deeper free trade and
investment commitments than is possible in a divided WTO.
WTO negotiations are grinding slowly. Many member governments –
especially from the global South - oppose any resurrection of the
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) at the WTO. But expanding the
liberalization agenda through bilateral agreements is a stealthy step-by-
step approach which could prepare a multiple launchpad for more
comprehensive multilateral agreements. Once countries are enmeshed in
webs of bilateral investment agreements, it will be harder to resist an
MAI-type agreement at the WTO.
Chapter 11, NAFTA¡¯s powerful investment chapter provides foreign
corporations with rights to sue governments for enacting public policies
or laws which they claim to affect their profitability. Too bad if they
protect the environment, health and safety, support local small
businesses or jobs. Many bilateral free trade and investment agreements
contain similar provisions as well as ¡°national treatment¡± clauses
which state that foreign companies and investors must be treated no less
favourably than local companies and investors. Before this can be
expanded to bind 34 countries under the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), countries are being sued under obscure bilateral investment
treaties (BITs). Transnational water giant Bechtel is currently suing
Bolivia under a 1992 Holland-Bolivia BIT for loss of profits after the
reversal of Cochabamba¡¯s water privatization following a popular
uprising.
William D. Rogers of Washington, DC law firm Arnold and Potter argues
that investment treaties are ¡°an open invitation to unhappy investors,
tempted to complain that a financial or business failure was due to
improper regulation, misguided macroeconomic policy or discriminatory
treatment by the host government and delighted by the opportunity to
threaten the national government with a tedious expensive arbitration¡±
(speech to Inter-American Development Bank Conference, October 26-27,
2000).
NAFTA dispute horror stories such as the Ethyl Corp.- Canada case were
vital in campaigning against the ill-fated OECD MAI. ¡°It seems the high-
profile disputes under the NAFTA appear to have inspired many litigators
to dust off the NAFTA¡¯s more obscure predecessors,¡± writes Luke Eric
Peterson (Changing Investment Litigation, Bit by BIT, Bridges Between
Trade and Sustainable Development 5, No. 4, May 2001), commenting on the
recent upsurge in investor-state disputes under bilateral agreements. In
many bilateral agreements where a dispute cannot be settled amicably and
procedures for settlement have not been agreed within a specified
period, it can be referred to a body like the World Bank¡¯s private
arbitration body for investment disputes, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the UN Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). NAFTA lets unhappy investors choose
between the two. Either way, they represent the privatisation of
commercial justice.
Founded in 1966, over half of ICSID¡¯s cases were filed in the past six
years, mainly under investment treaties. Today, there are some 2000
BITs. UNCTAD describes them as ¡°the most important protection of
international foreign.investment¡± to date.
¡°In a way¡¦bilateral and multilateral investment treaties are to ICSID
what Prince Charming was to Sleeping Beauty, having stirred the
activities of the Centre,¡± ICSID lawyer Eloïse Obadia told the Swiss
Arbitration Association Conference on Investment Treaties and
Arbitration in Zurich in January 2002.
¡°During the first 30 years of its existence, ICSID was somewhat of a
¡°Sleeping Beauty,¡± with an average of one or two cases being
registered each year. It is with the widespread development of bilateral
and multilateral investment treaties that the activities of ICSID have
awakened¡±, she said.
Unless you are a successful corporate claimant, investor-state disputes
are no fairytale.
Pakistan currently faces three investor-state dispute claims pending at
ICSID totalling around US$ 1 billion. Swiss company SGS, whose board of
directors includes former WTO Director-General Mike Moore, is claiming
$120 million from Pakistan for premature termination of a contract to
provide pre-shipment inspection services, an alleged breach of a 1996
Switzerland-Pakistan BIT. An ICSID panel met in Paris in February to
consider the case but reserved its judgement.
Italian construction firm Impregilo, which headed the consortium to
build the controversial Ghazi Barotha dam, part of a major hydroelectric
project, wants $450 million. Using a Pakistan-Italy BIT, Impregilo
claims Pakistan¡¯s Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)
seriously breached its contractual commitments. Turkish company Bayinder
filed a similar-sized claim over termination of its motorway
construction contract. Like many other BITs, the definitions of
¡°investment¡± and other terms in the agreements which Pakistan signed
are very broad and afford investors ample opportunity to claim against a
frighteningly wide range of actions or omissions by the government and
its agencies.
This March, an UNCITRAL tribunal awarded $353 million to Central
European Media (CME) in its dispute with the Czech Republic under a
Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT. CME claimed that the Czech Republic¡¯s
Media Council had deprived it of its stake in TV Nova, a Prague English
language TV station. It claimed that the government failed to ensure CME
fair and equitable treatment, and failed to accord full protection and
security to CME¡¯s investment, and that its acts constituted measures
tantamount to expropriation of its investment. The Czech Republic faces
other disputes. Saluka Investments, a Dutch subsidiary of Japanese
banking corporation Nomura has filed an arbitration claim seeking over
$1 billion, claiming discriminatory treatment relating to its investment
in the privatised IPB Bank which collapsed in 2000. Several other
disgruntled foreign companies announced their intention to file
international cases against the Czech government following the CME
ruling.
Domestic courts can be sidestepped by investors¡¯ recourse to
international arbitration panels. ICSID and UNCITRAL only allow for the
investor and government parties to the dispute to have legal standing.
The public has no right to listen to proceedings or view evidence or
submissions. Both bodies require only minimal disclosure of the names of
the parties and a brief indication of the subject matter. That makes
such disputes very difficult to track, let alone mobilise around. There
is little incentive for investors to settle disputes amicably given the
highly favourable outcomes for corporations which have initiated
proceedings under such agreements.
Who will pay these massive costs? International business law firms which
specialize in such cases are laughing all the way to the bank. The Czech
Republic spent an estimated $10 million in legal fees alone over the CME
dispute. Although the government is appealing the ruling, some officials
propose to hike value-added tax on goods and services so that all
taxpayers would absorb the costs. Regardless of how ICSID rules, these
cases will cost Pakistan millions of dollars. Ordinary people will
shoulder these costs which will increase their indebtedness to
international financial institutions, while compliance will be linked to
future foreign aid commitments and loans.
Alongside this proliferation of BITs, many bilateral free trade
agreements (FTAs) contain similar investment provisions, besides
expansive coverage of sectors like services, intellectual property,
government procurement, and agriculture. Many of these provisions go
well beyond WTO commitments.
With ¡°fast track¡± Trade Promotion Authority under its belt, the Bush
Administration is aggressively pursuing bilateral trade and investment
agreements. It wants to stitch up bilateral and regional deals just as
the EU has been doing, to secure greater access and control for US
companies.
¡°Just as modern business markets rely on the integration of networks,
we need a web of mutually reinforcing regional and bilateral trade
agreements to meet diverse commercial, economic, developmental and
political challenges¡±, said Robert Zoellick, US Trade Representative,
in his March 2003 ¡°Overview and the 2003 Agenda¡±. ¡°They also promote
the broader U.S. trade agenda by serving as models, breaking new
negotiating ground, and setting high standards¡¦.¡±
Early this month, the US and Chile signed an FTA. A similar deal with
Singapore has already been signed. FTAs with Morocco and Australia are
in the pipeline.
The Bush administration is ¡°rewarding¡± countries like Singapore,
Morocco and Australia for support in the ¡°war on terror¡± by
negotiating bilateral FTAs. Some believe that the US-Chile FTA signing
was delayed over Washington¡¯s displeasure at Santiago¡¯s lack of
support on Iraq. In New Zealand last month, opposition MPs and business
leaders crowed that Helen Clark¡¯s criticism of the invasion of Iraq had
cost the country an FTA with the US – though Zoellick¡¯s statements
indicated it had more to do with objections from the powerful US farming
lobby.
While an FTA with a ¡°moderate¡± Muslim country like Morocco offers much
political capital for the USA, US corporations are open about their own
capitalistic interests. The US-Morocco FTA Coalition, comprising US
corporations and pro-free trade organisations, wants to lock in Morocco¡¯
s economic reforms and get access to Morocco¡¯s markets, including its
telecommunications, tourism, energy, entertainment, transport, financial
services and insurance sectors. It wants a tighter Moroccan intellectual
property regime, and better market access for US agribusiness.
In FTA negotiations with Australia, the US seeks the removal of all
restrictions on investment like Australia¡¯s Foreign Investment Review
Board and limits on foreign investment in airlines, media and
telecommunications. US negotiators, urged on by American pharmaceutical
industries, want to get rid of Canberra¡¯s Pharmaceutical Benefits
Scheme which sets price controls for many prescription medicines. US
drug companies want more profits from higher pricing and full market
access for their products. These are some of the ¡°rewards¡± for John
Howard¡¯s loyal support for the US war on Iraq!
The US-Chile FTA aims to add momentum to FTAA negotiations and counter
growing opposition from a number of governments and social movements to
the proposed agreement.
The Chile and Singapore FTAs with the US have ¡°NAFTA-plus¡± broad
definitions of investment which throw the door wide open for disgruntled
investors to take a case to a dispute tribunal. Intellectual property
provisions go even further than the WTO¡¯s TRIPS (Trade-Related aspects
of Intellectual Property rights) agreement, severely limiting the
grounds for allowing use of compulsory licensing of medicines, and
effectively extending the 20-year term of drug company patent monopolies
by an additional five years, threatening access to affordable medicines,
not least HIV/AIDS drugs.
Both agreements impose alarming new limits on the use of capital
controls. Kavaljit Singh, Director of Delhi¡¯s Public Interest Research
Centre, argues that Chile¡¯s controls on capital inflows have helped
insulate it against financial crises. It ¡°stands to reason that the
probability of occurrence of a financial crisis in Chile and Singapore
would increase manifold with the removal of capital controls as
envisaged in the bilateral trade agreements with the US.¡° (Trading Away
Capital Controls, Asia-Europe Dialogue, 13/04/03)
Even free traders have slammed this aspect of these FTAs. Jagdish
Bhagwati and Daniel Tarullo wrote: ¡°The intention of the Bush
administration to use these two agreements as "templates" for other
trade agreements, possibly including the Doha round, means that
acceptance of the capital control provisions could engender a trade
policy that causes far-reaching damage. The prohibition on capital
controls has the makings of a US foreign policy debacle. Imagine that a
government imposes short-term capital controls in order to manage
financial problems. Compensation will ensue, but only for American
investors. The citizens of the developing country will then see a rich
US corporation or individual being indemnified while everyone else in
the country suffers from the crisis. One would be hard-pressed to think
of a better prescription for anti-American outrage.¡± (A Ban On Capital
Controls Is A Bad Trade-Off, Financial Times, 17/03/03)
When it comes to bilateral trade and investment agreements, we can¡¯t
afford to be Sleeping Beauties. It¡¯s time to get ugly about them.
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