주간녹색좌파(Green Left Weekly) 426호에 실린 아셈투쟁 관련 글입니다. 국민행동 영문 홈페이지 자유게시판에 올렸지만, 국내 독자들도 읽어 보는 게 좋을 것 같아, 이곳에 퍼다 놓습니다. 번역해서 올리지 못해, 죄송합니다. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Green Left Weekly, Issue #426 November 1, 2000 SOUTH KOREA: What went wrong with O20? SEOUL : The protests against the Asia-Europe parliamentary meetings (ASEM) on October 20 (O20) in Seoul were very lively, youthful and colourful (see GLW #425). However, they also reflected the most pressing problems facing the South Korean left movement. In Europe, Australia and the United States, the rise of a new movement against the global neo-liberalism has begun. A new generation of energetic radicals are jettisoning the passivity of their forebears. In the process, they have begun to inspire older layers of working people and are reawakening the sense of solidarity with the oppressed people of the countries of the Third World. It is different in South Korea. A radicalisation of the student and democracy movements culminated in the great upsurge of 1987, which drew in the mass of industrial workers and began today's democratic labour movement. But just as the movement was ascending, giving rise to vigorous discussions on political strategy and party organisation, the collapse of Eastern Europe brought chaos. Retreat The majority of the left retreated politically, while remaining within a labour movement that was continuing to win major gains. This was in no small part due to the intervention of a layer of class-struggle militants and revolutionaries. Instead of a new mass political formation, the movement in 1995 produced the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), which brought together the militant democratic unions that had mushroomed since 1987. This was also the fruit of hard work by the militant and revolutionary minority in the workers' movement. The KCTU's first major test was the general strike of winter 1996-97 against the revision of labour laws. The defeat of the general strike clarified the political differentiation that had taken place within the left. The reformist majority drew the conclusion that they needed friendly forces in parliament. In contrast, the advance of the labour movement to a general strike inspired the revolutionaries, who concluded that what was needed more than ever was a political leadership of the mass economic struggle. These differences hardened further with the beginning of the economic crisis in late 1997 and the inauguration of the liberal-populist Kim Dae-jung regime shortly afterwards. With no strategic alternative to capitalism, the KCTU leadership began to compromise with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its structural adjustment program. The political differentiation came to be expressed organisationally. In early 1999, the parliamentarist Democratic Labour Party (DLP) was formed, primarily to contest the general elections. In August 1999, revolutionaries and militants regrouped with the formation of Power of the Working Class (PWC). Following the 1987 downfall of military rule, a liberal citizens' movement began organising to transform many of the deeply conservative and repressive features of South Korean society and culture. Its fundamental political character immediately drew it to the Kim Dae-jung regime and a cozy relationship has developed. The liberal citizens' groups have gained influence and legitimacy through participation in government institutions, while the regime has used the citizens' groups as cheerleaders for its program of social consensus and economic liberalisation. Problems This year, the KCTU's DLP leaders have flirted with the citizens' movement in their search for wider support outside the working class to cover their retreat. For instance, both movements opposed the right of doctors to strike in July. O20 was organised by an alliance of the People's Rally Committee (PRC), which was the largest component; Citizens' Action Against the WTO and Investment Treaties; and the ASEM Non-Government Organisation Forum (Mingan), a peak body of the liberal citizens' movement and non-government organisations (NGOs) In reality, the leadership of O20 was in the hands of the DLP-oriented leadership of the KCTU, which was the largest force in the PRC. The KCTU tops were reinforced by their liberal allies in Mingan (in which the KCTU also participates). Problems resulted because the KCTU leadership has an ambiguous attitude toward the Kim Dae-jung regime, while Mingan has an ambiguous attitude to ASEM and is fully behind Kim Dae-jung. Mingan views ASEM as a qualitatively different institution to the IMF and the World Trade Organisation. It believes ASEM can accommodate the wishes of NGOs to an extent that the others cannot. Thus, it supported a policy of critical intervention in the ASEM process and opposed the tactic of blockading the ASEM meeting. This led the KCTU to also, in effect, oppose the blockade, while paying lip service to it. The turnout of less than 1000 at the conference venue on the morning of October 20 and the feebleness of the action clearly revealed the brakes that had been applied by the KCTU. The KCTU's true intentions were revealed in a manoeuver at a media conference on October 16. There, Mingan and the KCTU unilaterally decided and publicised ?that the main O20 action would be a rally at Olympic Park, far from the ASEM venue. They had the prior agreement of the PRC and Citizens' Action for this announcement. There was a naked material basis for this. As the PWC explained its October 19 statement: The NGO Forum [Mingan] clearly showed what the `critical intervention' line is all about their acceptance of sponsorship of more than 120 million won (A$200,000) from the German and other European governments, and more than 150 million won (A$250,000) from the Kim Dae-jung regime, for the opening of the NGO Forum [meeting with the ASEM representatives] which, to them, is the all-important event. This statement caused great strife within Mingan but the KCTU staunchly chose to remain compromised. In the PWC's words:
