Struggle against Privatization of Public Utilities and the Power Plant Workers’ Strike
November, 2003
Presented at Jubilee South conference on Debt and Privatization
People’s solidarity for social progress(korea)
e-mail : pssp@jinbo.net home page : www.pssp.org
1. Democratic workers movement in Korea and the development of unionism in the public sector
Workers movement in Korea began from the struggles of workers working in atrocious conditions in small factories during 1960’s and 70’s, led mainly by women workers. This movement led onto the development of a militant workers movement centered on male workers in large factories during the 1980’s. The development process of unionism in Korea is interrelated to the concentration and growth of monopolistic capital under dictatorial state power. Under this given condition, it was inevitable that concern of the workers movement - both in terms of organization and strategy – was focused on unionism in large factories dominated by monopoly capital. Of course, in this process, we cannot view the working class as being merely subordinate to the objective conditions of capitalist development and as having developed in a passive way. Workers’ struggle grew from extremity in the contradiction from expansion and growth of monopoly capital, and it was a process in which the ‘base’ of unionism developed to become a space for resistance. Thus the workers movement was quickly able to grow through the attack on capital by using the power of industrial action, through the power of strikes. We still remember the powerful struggles of the militant workers of that time – the struggles of the workers in the shipyards, the workers on the railroads. It was during these times that the central leadership of the Korean working class movement was established, from the Korea Trade Union Congress (KTUC, ‘Jeonnohyeop’) to the present Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU). However, at the same time, in the midst of high level of concentration of capital under the subordinate capitalist regime, reformist tendencies also grew. This has been one of the conditions that prevented unionism from developing further.
In the case of the public sector, it was set in different conditions from the private sector, in the sense that it played a positive role in the growth of state monopoly capital and in state-led development strategy. In particular, the severe repression of past regimes on militant unionism rendered difficult for unionism in the public sector to develop within the working class movement, and left it under the stern control and management of state capital. However, in May 1990, through the struggles for democratization of the Korean Broadcasting Service (KBS), the struggles of railroad, subway and health workers and the struggles of teachers to build a union, the Korea Congress of Independent Industrial Trade Union Federations (‘Upjonghweui’) was established, bringing together 13 industrial union federations. In November 1994, the Public Sector Labour Congress (‘Gongnodae’) was formed to include all unions in the public sector, and in 1998, the Korean Federation of Transportation, Public & Social Services Workers Unions (KPSU) was established as an affiliate of the KCTU. Although the growth of workers movement in the Korean public sector was somewhat deterred by false consciousness from stable working conditions and the severe control of the state, it grew in accordance with the historical development of class struggle.
2. Unionism in the public sector and the present state of workers’ class consciousness
Most unions in the public sector grew quickly after the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle and developed further during the neoliberal storm of restructuring. This is because of the restructuring of the public sector, privatization, and flexibilization of labour have led to increased work intensity and deterioration of working conditions. Of course, the restructuring process itself cannot be seen as being different from the private sector, however, we must also focus on the particularity of the public sector.
First of all, lay-offs and restructuring policies based on flexibilization formed conditions in which public sector workers could escape from the false consciousness that had pressed down the workers for a long time. This change in consciousness manifested itself in expansion of militancy and mobilization from below to attain democracy in the unions.
As previously mentioned, the public sector played a positive role in the formation of capitalism in an underdeveloped country through the direct control and management (dictatorial development) of the state. Although public services in the public sector was directly related to the survival of the citizens, public service – or public interest – was considered to be a strong weapon of the state that can support the circulation and reproduction of monopoly capital. Also, the particular conditions of the public sector were defined according to the political sensitivity of the state, and industrial relations in public corporations were directly subordinated to the state. In this situation, the growth of militancy in the Korean workers movement paradoxically led to the oppression of democracy and militancy in the public sector. In other words, the government and capital prevented militant unionism from spreading to the public sector by strengthening its control over the public workers. Thus, in the case of public sector unions, they were vulnerable to the ‘easy way’ – to a conciliatory and corporatist movement. As a result, public sector unions were not free from the negative characteristics that developed in the public sector, such as bureaucracy in public corporations and collusion with politicians. Of course, the struggles within the unions to overcome these perverted industrial relations and culture led to the establishment of the KPSU, and one cannot overlook the fact that attempts to democratize unions and build the strength of rank-and-file workers still continue. However, unionism in the public sector has ‘relatively’ existed as a ‘dead angle’ at a point where the direct control and the division-and-rule strategy of the state met. In fact, the distorted unionism in public corporations and their practices were enough to twist industrial relations into a conciliatory one. The patriarchal and militaristic cultural base that appeared even in unionism repeated itself in the relationships between the workers and with the management. Thus, the false consciousness that workers had been instilled with led not to the development of working class consciousness but to that of responsibility and sacrifice for the sake of preservation of capitalism and the maintenance of the nation-state.
However, this kind of consciousness manifested in a contradictory way in face of neoliberal restructuring ie., privatization and flexibilization. At the moment, the sense of ‘responsibility’ and ‘sacrifice’ is acting as a new motivation of struggle in face of neoliberal attacks. Restructuring that focus particularly on the public sector and the abrupt deterioration in the working conditions can no longer secure the livelihoods of public sector workers. The oppressive mechanisms of state control and capital are mandated through a single order from the Ministry of Planning and Budget, and the public sector is pressured to become the model of restructuring. Voluntary retirement, lay-offs, increased work intensity are all being concentrated on public sector workers. They are vulnerable to direct threat on their livelihoods. This neoliberal restructuring has brought about a fast development of individual and collective resistance on the part of the workers. The workers were able to overcome their false consciousness based on patriotism, start a movement for democratization of unions and become the subjects of real struggle.
Secondly, the deterioration of public interest that has come from privatization policies and the contention surrounding the issue of public interest (this is potentially an issue that includes visions of change and transformation of capitalism) have become an important link in expanding social solidarity of the public sector.
If we refer to the struggle against restructuring of the electricity industry of 1999 and 2000, the confidence of electricity workers against the logic of privatization was weak, and the workers had to begin from an inferior position. Also, because the leadership was weak, those who were in the forefront of the struggle themselves were not confident enough on the significance and possibility of their struggle. However, the effects on the general public of issues such electricity bill hike, loss of sovereignty and domination of transnational capital of a state infrastructure such as electricity were more than expected. Of course, there was the stimulus from the ‘patriotic and nationalistic’ tendencies prevalent in Korean society.
Restructuring of the electricity industry was viewed as “loss of sovereignty” before being viewed from a class perspective as an anti-labour policy dictated by neoliberalism or capitalistic restructuring. There was an expansion of “patriotism and nationalism” more than anything else. This kind of ideology can be used as methods of repression and oppression of unionism and workers’ struggle. For example, the 1995 strike of Korea Telecom was branded as being subversive and the 2000 struggle of Korea Electric Power Corporation was pressured under the ideology “strikes lead to collapse of the nation” – these examples show the limitations of workers struggle based on patriotism. Of course, this ideology does not dominate workers only in the public sector. Nevertheless, it was easy for the logic of capital such as “economy must be restructured for the nation to survive”, “economy can only recuperate through restructuring”, “workers’ struggles frighten away foreign investors and this will lead to another crisis” to be instilled in the minds of workers, disabling workers in forming resistance to this kind of ideology. The obscurity in the objective of the struggle acted as a limitation and thus deterred the development of class struggle.
However, the rationale of “public interest” used by capital during the state-led capitalist development began to act in a negative way for capital during the period of crisis. The fear of price hike, the sense of universal service and fear of efflux of national wealth became inherent in the minds of the public as issues related to livelihood.
For example, the abrupt heating price hike that resulted from the sell-off of steam supply utilities of Anyang and Bucheon led to the resistance of the local population. The local inhabitants voluntarily organized against price hikes and privatization. This is an example that shows the struggle around public interest has the potential to formulate solidarity between ordinary citizens and workers, as local solidarity actions. What is important is not the solidarity between the local inhabitants and the workers itself but how to expand the class characteristics of workers’ struggle. The development of workers’ struggle signifies that workers’ issues develop from those of the workplace to those against capitalism. It is a matter of organizing and forming solidarity for the entire working class. In this perspective, struggle against privatization and the solidarity that comes out of it are still in premature stages, and social solidarity remains superficial. However, it is important to note that the struggle has the potential to expand.
In the case of the railroad, an accident that resulted from the one-person operation of the Bundang rail showed the potential for the struggle in the public sector to become a mass and social struggle, not to mention the possibility to bring out the problems of restructuring and privatization in the public sector. The one-person operation aimed at lay-offs and cuts in labour cost, and the “automation” logic of capitalists aimed at downsizing were enough to prove the dangers of automation. Accidents from malfunction of trains manifest the inhumane characteristics of the logic of capitalist accumulation. It is evident that the privatization and sell-off of the rail will lead to price hikes and infringement of universal rights. Ordinary citizens will be unable to use the trains for their everyday survival and activities, and the main national railroads will transform into luxury means of transportation reserved for the rich.
Korea Telecom has become a ground for rivalry between domestic and foreign capital, with foreign capital owning more than 50% of the assets. In this process, more than 20,000 workers have had to leave their workplaces, and the workers resisted during the winter of 2000, in May 2001 (women workers fighting against division of the company) and onwards (by irregular workers). In fact, the workers of Korea Telecom fought in the forefront against public sector restructuring and privatization, and they have experienced all sorts of difficulties. They have fought for more than a decade over liberalization of international call market, of the mobile phone market and over division of the company. Restructuring aimed at increased competition, efficiency and privatization led to repetitive or excessive investment, excessive competition, bankruptcies and then to monopoly. Concessions to the conglomerates (‘jaebols’) in the mobile service market have led to mergers and monopoly. Phones bills have hiked and public interest eroded. The telecommunications industry has become a playground for speculation of transnational capital. The effects of privatization of Korea Telecom and the sacrifice that workers have had to make are being fully exposed.
3. Joint strike of power plant, railroad and gas workers, and the 38-day strike of power plant union
On 30th October 2001, 6 unions – railroad, power plant, gas, power engineering, district heating and high-speed rail – along with the KPSU formed the “Joint Struggle Headquarters against Privatization of Public Industries”. On 15th November, a broader coalition (National Joint Committee) to include other organizations was formed. There were difficulties in organizing a general strike and solidarity actions due to differences in the conditions of each of the unions. Thus, the Joint Struggle Headquarters decided to implement a joint vote on industrial action during 26th to 29th November. The vote took place in five unions. 72.23% for railroad, 95.5% for gas, 77.0% for high-speed rail, 89.28% for district heating and 85.8% for power engineering voted in favour of the industrial action. On 30th November, the unions held a press conference to announce the results of the vote and plans for joint action. The unions declared that should the legislation to promote privatization of rail and gas be included in the agenda of the National Assembly, they will immediately go on a general strike. They also declared that they will mobilize joint action. Luckily, the legislation for privatization of rail was postponed, and the possibility for joint action of three unions opened up as the power plant union sped up with its plans for action.
Until the commencement of the general strike was actually declared on 25th February 2002 at 4:00am, nobody believed that a joint strike action by three unions would be possible. It may have been a surprise even for the 8,000 gas and power plant workers who had gathered in Seoul National University and the 10,000 railroad workers who were spread across the nation in various universities that night. In particular, the strike of the power plant workers was truly a historical strike of 38 days, in the sense that it was the first strike by workers who generate electricity, that it was the first strike to succeed with the “disperse struggle” tactic and that it was a struggle in which the family members put up an even more courageous resistance. Of course, the fact that the railroad and the gas unions, which had participated in the joint action, came up with an agreement with the management was a pity.
The Kim Dae-Jung government responded to the strike of power plant workers repressively. The Kim Dae-Jung government had propagated itself to be reformist, however, it was giving up on all its promises. The government, at that time, was also showing signs of a regime that had failed to resolve impending issues. However, on the matter of restructuring, the government showed all determination to promote neoliberal policies. Although public opinion was expanding on the problems of power plant sell-offs and privatization, the government was adamant to push forward with restructuring of national infrastructure – merely reaffirming the close relationship with the interests of domestic and transnational capital. From the beginning of the struggle, the government was focused only on repression, and the attitude of the management was that of insolence. The attitude of the management, which did not even recognize the trade union, only poured oil onto the already infuriated workers. The management and the police continued to search through motels and internet cafes to arrest workers who were on “disperse struggle”, made unwarranted search through offices and houses, and performed other illegal acts and violations of human rights. The hardline attitude of the government only made the workers lose hope of compromise and pushed them to resist harder.
In fact, the hardline repression of the government and the refusal of the management to negotiate came from the recognition of the significance and power of the struggles of power plant workers. They knew what the conflict between management and workers and the conflict between the government and workers will lead to, and also what the result would be should they give into the demands of the workers. The future of not only privatization policies but also of labour policies in general, and the speed with which those policies can be implemented all depended on this strike. In short, for the government and capital, the success of power plant sell-off will determine whether they will be able to continue with their restructuring policies or whether they will fail. This was more so, because the issue of privatizing national infrastructure was becoming a hot issue among the general public. The extreme actions of the government continued in this respect. Furthermore, because the struggle against privatization was closely related to the matter of ownership and operation of public enterprises, and also to maintaining public interest (ie., control by the people the public role of the state) this issue went further than merely the public sector. The struggle against sell-off of power plants was a struggle to protect the livelihood of workers, but also was a demand for the state to maintain its public role in the energy industry. It was because of this essence that the possibility for solidarity was enlarged. In fact, the demand the unions made from the beginning of the joint struggle for direct negotiation with the government was not merely a matter of the government actually coming to the negotiation table or how to form the table. It signified that the anti-privatization struggle of power plant workers was not limited to the workplace but went beyond to that of a struggle against neoliberal policies of capital themselves. It signified that the struggle was developing to become a direct front against the government and capital as a whole.
4. Strike of power plant workers
► Beginning of the strike
Despite the big significance of the joint struggle of the three unions, there was fear as to whether the strike ranks could be maintained in a situation where only the power plant union remained and the “disperse struggle” had never succeeded. In fact, the workers started a strike for the very first time with the judgment that electricity will be cut off within a few days of the strike. However, the plants continued to produce electricity despite a few errors here and there. It was inevitable for the struggle to prolong, but there had not been enough preparations for a long struggle. However, the solidarity general strike of the KCTU on 26th February and on 26th March encouraged the power plant workers.
► Mid-period of the strike
The “flash rally ” of 10th March was an important momentum. During this period, there was a lot of support being mobilized to feed and accommodate the workers. This kind of support was very important. It was a public confirmation that the struggle will have to be prolonged, and it was also a period during which strike tactics and solidarity needed to be actively planned and organized. Members of KCTU all across the nation and many social organizations made great efforts to support the power plant workers. Feeding and housing striking workers may seem a low form of solidarity, however, the bonding that was formed between the 5,300 workers and the supporters was a new experiment and formed a basis for future solidarity. In whole of Korean society, people actively united with the power plant workers.
However, the government went beyond merely demanding a “ban to any mention of privatization” to forcefully pushing for “recognition and acceptance of privatization”. The government refused proposals from National Assembly members who called for public discussion, blocked all possibilities of dialogue and then forced the workers to sign a document recognizing privatization. Negotiations failed and there was some cautious debate on future tactics. On 24th March at 6pm, the workers attempted a rally at Yonsei University, where they all met for the first time in a long time and were able to gather up their courage and reaffirm their objective.
► Return to workplace and repression
On 1st April at 10pm, negotiations started with the government. However, the government simply repeated for the workers “to recognize and sign an agreement stating that privatization cannot and should never be an agenda for negotiation”. Negotiations failed. However, it was picked up again on 3rd April, and the KCTU postponed its general strike. However, the power plant workers refused the proposal, and the union declared that “it will gather all workers to make a collective decision, have an assembly on 2nd April, return to work on 5th April as of 9am, and then vote on the result of the negotiation after having returned to work”. However, the assembly could not take place because of police blockade. The KCTU also refused the proposal on 3rd April and formed a new emergency counteraction committee. The power plant workers returned to work after 2nd April with 348 workers laid-off. Also, the management tried to swap seizures on property, lay-offs and penalties with secession from the KPSU and the KCTU. The government and the management repressed the workers in unimaginable ways. They performed so-called “mentality education”, blocked laid-off workers from entering the workplace, locked up important facilities and focused on dividing the 5,600 union members. However, despite all the repression, in 2003, the union was able to stop the sell-off of the Southeast Power Corporation. Although there are many tasks to be done in the future, the power plant workers were successful.
5. What is left?
The struggles that took place in the beginning of 2002 with the joint strike of three unions, led to the strong struggle of the power plant workers and was a battle against neoliberal policies and the ruling class. It was a struggle that would determine the power relation between capital and labour, and the speed and the degree with which future restructuring policies will be promoted.
▪ The government and capital were indeed strong. They went beyond expectation and sometimes hit us from behind. On the other hand, we were weak. The lack of confidence led to organization protectionism, which was also a problem. Victory and failure of a struggle depend on power relations. It is true that our power was weak and there may have been bigger possibilities of failure. However, one must be prepared to fail in order to gain the opportunity for victory, and it is at this point that a struggle can take place. Resistance and struggle is rising up in all areas against the attack of capital under neoliberalism, however, those struggles are not being formulated into one struggle. This is the situation that democratic workers movement and other progressive movements all around the world face. The front of the struggle is being expanded, however, confidence, response and leadership are lacking. It is important to note that this is a structural limitation that unionism and the workers movement face.
▪ Many people were skeptical about the “disperse struggle” tactic. They were skeptical as to whether a new union such as the power plant union can actually make this tactic work. However, the workers did it splendidly. Although this tactic was successful because of all the solidarity and support that were given to them, we cannot underestimate the actual effort of the workers to actually make it happen. Even during the period when there were doubts about whether the struggle can really develop into a large general strike, many workers were becoming politicized. The determination of the mass was ahead of the leaders. We can no longer define mass struggle based on our past experiences of failure and retreat. We must trust the dynamics of the mass. Only then can a break through open up.
▪ There is a definite tendency in which unionism and the workers movement in individual workplaces get immersed in “practical” conditions. This can be so if the movement is viewed only as that of the “union”. However, it would not be objective to say that unionism cannot develop into a political struggle or a struggle for transformation of society. Should we block any possibilities of development, based on the premise that structural limitations exist within unionism, we will not be able to explain the development, the process and the momentum in the formation of working class consciousness. Of course, the power, size and characteristics of the Korean workers movement are decided and limited by large factories and a number of major workplaces. The strikes of unions depend on the power of the strike – the ability to stop production, hit a blow to capital, and shake the ruling class. It is obvious that there needs to be a struggle that can hit a blow to the monopoly that has developed in Korea throughout the neoliberal restructuring process. Thus, the size and power of a struggle are important factors. In fact, the size and power of the joint strike of the railroad, gas and power plant unions indeed expanded the front against capital. However, the topography of struggle that has large nationwide factories as its center is unstable. There have been many cases where one workplace that deviated from the ranks destabilized the whole struggle and failed to even start. The qualitative development of the workers movement is compulsory at this point.
We hope that through this international conference on neoliberal privatization of the public sector such as water and energy will grow into a global struggle to stop these policies. We must recognize that although our struggle starts and ties the knot in our respective countries, globalization of capital dilutes the significance of national struggles. In the case of Korea, public opinion has more-or-less been formed on the issue of privatization of rail, electricity and gas. Of course, our power is still weak. However, the issue of strengthening people’s control and operation of public corporations is emerging as an important topic. Also, we must extend our boundaries of struggle and strengthen social and public interest to include the protection of public education, health, culture and other areas
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Struggle against Privatization of Public Utilities and the Power Plant Workers’ Strike
